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The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in 
organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and 
production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results 
demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially increase productivity by facilitating 
coordination, and that the effect strongly interacts with the exact shape of the production 
function. Taken together, our data highlight the relevance of the production function for 
organization construction and suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams. 
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 1 Introduction
￿Some contend that di￿erentiation is nuts ￿ bad for morale. They say that di￿erential
treatment erodes the very idea of teamwork. Not in my world. You build strong teams by
treating individuals di￿erently. ... Everybody’s got to feel they have a stake in the game.
But that doesn’t mean everyone on the team has to be treated the same way.￿
Jack Welch, former chairman and CEO of General Electric 1
A general feature of incentive schemes in organizations is a non-uniform
distribution of bene￿ts among its agents, which usually accounts for the het-
erogeneity in agents’ ability and performance. As long as the discrimination
is based on individual di￿erences, i.e., as long as unequal agents are rewarded
unequally, there should be little scope for fairness considerations to induce
dissonance among the agents.2 However, a recent theoretical model devel-
oped by Eyal Winter (2004) shows that it might even be optimal to treat
equal agents unequally ￿ depending on externalities given by the production
function. This surprising result, derived under the standard assumptions of
fully rational, self-centered and money-maximizing behavior, seems to stand
in sharp contrast to the implications from research on fairness and equity
preferences, whose bottom line is that ￿even a small intrinsic concern for
justice, .. may have signi￿cant e￿ects on .. wage structure￿ (Konow (2000),
p. 1089; see also Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Mowday (1991), Young (1994) or Selten (1978)). In the present paper, we ex-
perimentally explore the interaction in teams and test within the framework
of Winter’s model whether the psychological cost of the inequality induced
by a discriminating mechanism deters from the e￿ciency of the theoreti-
cal optimal mechanism. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we report the
￿rst empirical evidence on the interplay between equity, coordination and
production function within teams. 3
1Quote from Welch and Byrne (2001).
2A necessary assumption for this statement is that agents are aware of the individual
di￿erences and do not misperceive the direction of the di￿erences; which might for example
not hold true if agents are overcon￿dent about their own performance (see Ross and Sicoly
(1979) for early evidence on overcon￿dence about contribution to a joint project).
3The existing literature on team production and teamwork, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz
1The general model as described in Winter (2004) features n risk-neutral
agents who work on a project. Each agent i decides simultaneously whether
to work (ei = 1) or shirk (ei = 0). Exerting e￿ort is connected with costs
c, with c being constant across all agents. Individual e￿ort is assumed to
be non-observable and non-contractible. Instead, agents’ rewards are con-
tingent on the success of the project, i.e., agents receive individual rewards
b = (b1;:::;bn) if the project succeeds and 0 otherwise. The probability
p(k) of the project’s success is speci￿ed as a function of the number k of
agents exerting e￿ort, mapping the e￿ort pro￿les to [0;1]. In this sense,
p(k) can be interpreted as the project’s technology or production function.
We assume p(k) to be strictly increasing in k. Depending on the exact
speci￿cation of p(k), the production function can be modeled to have in-
creasing or decreasing returns to scale. By increasing returns to scale we
mean that the production function is one of complementarity, i.e., that
p(k+1) p(k) increases in k; whereas a production function of substitutabil-
ity has decreasing returns to scale, i.e., p(k + 1)   p(k) is decreasing in k
(k 2 [0;:::;n   1]).4
In the following, a reward vector b is said to be strongly incentive-inducing
if it induces all agents to exert e￿ort as a unique Nash equilibrium, and it
is optimal if it does so at minimal cost of rewards. The mechanism is sym-
metric if rewards are constant across all agents. It can be shown that such a
symmetric, optimal, strongly incentive-inducing mechanism exists if and only
if the production function is one of substitutability. Contrarily, a production
function of complementarity implies the optimal, strongly incentive-inducing
mechanism to be fully discriminating ￿ even if all agents are perfectly sym-
metric!
(1972), Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) or Irlenbusch and Ruchala (forthcoming), usually
focusses on the problem of free-riders and provides means to organize and discipline sel￿sh
workers. Complementing this line of research, our paper points to the di￿culties that
can arise if incentive schemes originally designed for sel￿sh agents are applied to other-
regarding agents; thus, interestingly, in our setup it is the absence of sel￿sh agents, and
not their presence, that constitutes a potential source of ine￿ciency for work teams.
4For the sake of simplicity we only consider the two extreme cases of increasing or
decreasing returns to scale here. In general, the production function could take any form,
as long as it satis￿es the assumption of p(k) being strictly increasing in k.
2Consider that a technology of increasing returns to scale is a su￿cient,
but not a necessary, condition for full discrimination. In fact, it is only
necessary that an agent’s incentive to exert e￿ort increases with the number
of other agents who do so, which for example might also be caused by some
psychological e￿ect like peer pressure (cp. Kandel and Lazear (1992), Barron
and Gjerde (1997), Falk and Ichino (2006) or Mas and Moretti (2007) and
the references therein).
The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test the key ￿ndings
of Winter’s model, namely whether subjects’ behavior is indeed sensitive to
the externalities given by the production technology, and whether a major in-
centive advantage really exists when discriminating among perfectly identical
agents; or if the psychological cost of the unequal treatment of equals drives
a wedge between the initially predicted and the actually observed e￿ciency.
Ideally, these questions would be examined with ‘cloned’ workers acting in
‘cloned’ work environments which di￿er only with respect to the production
function and the reward schemes. To come close to this ideal world, we
introduce a simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment that allows us to
analyze the interaction between production function, equity considerations,
and reward scheme, while at the same time ensuring that agents are perfectly
identical. In the experiment, three players work on a joint project and exert
costly e￿orts. Their payo￿s, given as reward minus cost, depend on the
number of some goods produced by the joint project. Across the di￿erent
treatments, the characteristics of the production function (either a function
of complementarity or of substitutability) as well as of the reward scheme
(either a symmetric or a discriminating mechanism) are manipulated.
We ￿nd that, as predicted by Winter’s model, the subjects in our exper-
iment respond to the shape of the production function. The discriminating
reward scheme under the production function of complementarity achieves
almost maximum e￿ciency, whereas it leads to signi￿cantly lower e￿ciency
rates under the production function of substitutability. Moreover, our data
suggest that subjects’ e￿ort choices are highly sensitive to their own reward,
but largely unresponsive to the rewards of the other two subjects in their
group: The disadvantaged player (receiving the low reward) regularly exerts
3e￿ort under the production function of complementarity, notwithstanding the
unequal treatment of equals. Contrarily, the symmetric reward scheme sig-
ni￿cantly hampers e￿ciency, demonstrating that equal treatment of equals
is not necessarily a prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams, and
that unequal treatment can facilitate coordination within the workforce.
The insights gained from our experiment are of signi￿cant importance
for research on optimal mechanism design in general, but especially in the
context of work contracts and organizations. As Winter puts it: ￿A large
number of models in personnel economics establishes that unequal treatment
of unequal agents may have major incentive advantages. The particular im-
portance of demonstrating the optimality of treating equals unequally is that
it potentially implies an additional gain for inequality in each of these mod-
els￿ (Winter (2004), p. 766). We complement this assertion by ascertaining
it in an empirical way.
In this regard, we contribute to the question of ￿equality versus inequal-
ity￿, which is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. Inter-
nal inequity is thought to have a tendency to lead to morale problems and to
interfere with teamwork (cp. Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Milgrom and Roberts
1992, or Bewley 1999, chapter 6), whereas equal wages are usually associ-
ated with positive e￿ects (e.g., increased peer monitoring or lower transac-
tion costs, see Knez and Simester 2001 or Prendergast 1999). However, as
Lazear (1989, p. 561) puts it, ￿.. it is far from obvious that pay equality has
these e￿ects.￿ For example, equal wages do not account for heterogeneity in
agents’ ability and performance, and payment is not linked to the individ-
ual’s marginal product, which in turn can lead to free-riding among sel￿sh
agents (cp. Holmstrom 1982). Moreover, as we demonstrate in our setup,
equal rewards make it hard to form exact beliefs about the others’ e￿ort. In
contrast, the asymmetry that is created by unequal rewards has the potential
to facilitate coordination within the workforce, because it reduces strategic
uncertainty about each others’ actions.
In real-life organizations, this discrimination is often implemented through
non-monetary rewards, e.g., prestige, or by using arti￿cial classi￿cations or
(job) titles for seemingly similar tasks, e.g., ‘Project Head’ or ‘Team Cap-
4tain’.5 It is often hidden to avoid negative reactions of inequality-averse
workers, or ￿xed by an internal (pay) structure. For example, lawyers, con-
sultants and accountants are paid according to seniority. This special form
of hidden discrimination creates common knowledge about the stakes that
everyone has in the project’s success, and thus fosters cooperation and coor-
dination; while at the same time it does not invoke equity concerns because
everyone knows that his turn will come to be senior partner. The experi-
mental results in the present paper show that under a production function
of complementarity even transparent discrimination contributes to e￿ciency,
yet hidden discrimination is e￿ective.
Our study di￿ers from existing experimental studies that analyze the in-
teraction between social preferences and reward schemes in several points.
First, the evidence up to now mainly stems from bilateral gift-exchange games
between a principal and a single agent (e.g., Fehr et al. (1993, 1997)). What
is usually observed in this setup is a positive wage-e￿ort relationship; if the
principal shares a large part of the total output with the worker, the worker
feels treated fairly and reciprocates by exerting a high e￿ort. While this sug-
gests that most workers care about fairness along a vertical dimension, our
question about possible horizontal comparisons within the workforce is usu-
ally not addressed.6 Second, the existing studies are mainly conducted in an
incomplete-contract framework where e￿ort and/or wage is non-contractible,
while we allow for complete contracts. 7 Third, the usual experimental setup
features a principal who can set wages anew in each period, but this intro-
duces uncontrolled elements of intentionality and reputation. Agents can
5The ‘Team Captain’, as the one carrying the responsibility and possible blame for un-
successful results, is highly motivated to exert e￿ort. Therefore, he functions to incentivize
the other team members in the same way as the high-reward agent in our model induces
cooperation and high productivity. Cp. also Winter (2004), p. 769.
6Two exceptions are notable which feature a multi-agents setup. In Charness and
Kuhn (2007), two workers di￿er in productivity. The authors ￿nd that co-workers’ wages
do not matter much for agents’ decisions. Contrarily, Abeler et al. (2006) demonstrate
that paying equal wages to workers exerting di￿erent e￿orts leads to a strong decline in
e￿ciency over time.
7In Keser and Willinger (2000) agents’ actions are hidden, but wage payments can
be made contingent on the observed output. However, again the focus is on the vertical
comparison between a principal and a single agent. Fehr et al. (2007) provide a direct
comparison on the e￿ciency of incomplete and complete contracts in a bilateral setup.
5withhold e￿ort to punish and enforce principals to pay higher wages in the
future, which to us not only seems di￿cult to reconcile with real-world work-
relationships, but additionally is outside the scope of Winter’s model. Fourth,
to the best of our knowledge we are the ￿rst to pay attention to the important
role of the production function in a labor market setting. 8 Our ￿nding that
agents’ behavior is sensitive to the shape of the production function should
be taken into account in future empirical research on the interaction between
social preferences and reward schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we describe the experimental design and derive theoretical predictions. Sub-
sequently, the experimental results are presented and discussed in Section 3,
and Section 4 concludes.
8Normann et al. (2007) examine the relation between production function and the
existence of large-buyers’ discounts.
62 Experimental Setup
Our experiment is designed to explore the interplay between production func-
tion, monetary rewards and social preferences within a team of agents. More
speci￿cally, we check if workers’ behavior is sensitive to the type of the pro-
duction function that they face in their joint project. Additionally, we test for
the tension between equity and e￿ciency in a team environment, as induced
by the interaction between social (other-regarding) preferences and reward
schemes.
2.1 Experimental Design
In the game we have three agents working on a joint project. Each agent i
individually decides whether to work (ei = 1) or shirk (ei = 0), and the
individual cost of exerting e￿ort is 90 Taler9. In case that an agent exerts
e￿ort, the costs of 90 are deducted from his individual reward. 10 The output
of the project, i.e. the number of produced units, depends on the number of
agents
P
i ei choosing to work, and on our treatment variable production
function:
number of units produced if...
production function
P
i ei = 0
P
i ei = 1
P
i ei = 2
P
i ei = 3
complementarity (COM) 20 40 65 100
substitutability (SUB) 20 55 80 100
The ￿rst case (COM) describes a production function of complementarity.
The technology has increasing returns to scales, since the number of produced
units (the output of the project) is p(0) = 20 if all agents shirk, p(1) = 40
if two agents shirk, p(2) = 65 if only one agent shirks and p(3) = 100 if all
agents work, thus p(3)   p(2) > p(2)   p(1) > p(1)   p(0). In the second
9Taler is our experimental currency. Talers earned in the experiment were converted
at a rate of 80 Taler = 1 Euro.
10Exact control over the underlying cost and production functions is crucial for testing
the theoretical model - which would not have been the case under, e.g., a real e￿ort task.
7case (SUB), we have a production function of substitutability. The technology
has decreasing returns to scale, since p(3) p(2) < p(2) p(1) < p(1) p(0).
Agents’ rewards are made contingent on the output of the project and
the reward mechanism or remuneration scheme, which we vary across
treatments. The reward mechanism in treatment 444COM is symmetric.
Each agent in the group receives a reward of 4 Taler per unit produced.
Contrarily, the mechanism implemented in treatments 345COM and 345SUB
is a discriminating one: agents’ reward per unit produced is either 3, 4, or 5
Taler (with each possibility occurring exactly once). At the same time, the
sum of the individual rewards does not di￿er across the reward mechanisms.
For example, the total reward costs in case that all agents shirk equals 3(4 
20) = 240 under the symmetric reward mechanism, and 320+420+520 =
240 under the discriminating reward mechanism.
Our experiment was conducted in a labor market framing, avoiding loaded
terms (e.g., ‘shirk’ or ‘success’). We used the same procedure in our three
treatment conditions 444COM, 345SUB and 345COM. Upon arrival, partic-
ipants were randomly divided into groups of three. In the treatments with
a discriminating reward scheme, the three possible rewards were randomly
assigned within each group. The written instructions were distributed and
read out aloud. Afterwards, subjects could pose questions in private, and
had to answer a set of computerized control questions to ensure that ev-
erybody had understood the game and to make subjects familiar with the
operation of the program. Then subjects were told their own reward and the
other players’ rewards, and simultaneously had to decide between working or
shirking. Afterwards, it was announced that we were additionally interested
in their beliefs about the other subjects’ behavior, and each subject had
to state what they expected the ￿rst and the second other player in their
group to choose.11 In case that their belief matched the actual behavior,
subjects were paid an additional 20 Taler. Only then we announced that ￿ve
additional periods of the game would follow, in which everything was kept
11E.g., a player receiving a reward of 3 Taler per unit had to choose between ‘4’ and
‘5’ shirk, ‘4’ and ‘5’ work, ‘4’ works and ‘5’ shirks, or ‘4’ shirks and ‘5’ works. To keep
the procedure constant, in 444COM we also asked separately for the behavior of the two
other players in the group.
8constant (individual rewards, costs, production function and group compo-
sition). This was done to allow for possible learning to take place. After our
experiment, subjects had to complete a social value orientation test 12 and a
socio-economic questionnaire.
The computerized13 experiments were run in 2007 at the BonnEconLab
at the University of Bonn. Participants were randomly recruited via email
invitation out of approximately 3000 persons from the BonnEconLab’s sub-
ject pool (including mostly undergraduate students from a large variety of
￿elds). For each treatment, we ran two sessions with 18 subjects each; to-
talling 12 independent matching groups (all periods) or 36 independent de-
cisions (only ￿rst period) per treatment. Unfortunately, in one session in
treatment 444COM, only 15 subjects showed up, so that we are missing one
of the twelve independent observations in this treatment. A session lasted ap-
proximately 70 minutes. Subjects were paid for their decision and their belief
in the ￿rst period, and additionally for one randomly selected period (which
was constant across all subjects within a session) out of the subsequent ￿ve
periods. On average, subjects earned approx. 7 Euro.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
In this section we derive the possible equilibria under the classical assump-
tions of agents being fully rational, self-centered, money-maximizing, and
risk-neutral14. As will be seen, the degree of e￿ciency, de￿ned as the sum
of agents exerting e￿ort in equilibrium, is sensitive to the production func-
tion and to the reward mechanism. Subsequently, we demonstrate how the
predictions change once we introduce agents who are additionally motivated
12The ‘ring test’ is described for example in Griesinger and Livingston (1973) or Liebrand
(1984); see also Beckenkamp (1995) for an early application in Economics.
13The experiment was programmed in Pascal using RATimage by Abbink and Sadrieh
(1995). The questionnaire and the ring test were conducted using zTree by Fischbacher
(1999). Screenshots of the program can be found in the appendix.
14Our game as described in Section 2.1 can be rewritten in a probabilistic way, which
is the interpretation used by Winter (2004). We instead opted for a deterministic repre-
sentation to impose risk-neutrality over the ￿nal outcome of the project, i.e., to pay the
expected value of a lottery rather than to actually implement the lottery. This allows us
to abstract from subjects’ individual risk preferences.
9by equity considerations. In this case, the degree of inequality of the reward
mechanism fundamentally a￿ects equilibrium behavior.
We start by calculating the reward per unit produced that is needed
to make an agent just indi￿erent between working and shirking, which de-
pends on the (belief about the) decisions of the other two players in the
group. Let X0 denote the reward that is needed if an agent believes that
both the other two agents in the group will shirk, and let X1 and X2 be
the corresponding values when expecting one, resp. none of the others to
shirk. Under a production function of complementarity, X0 is given as
40X0   90 = 20X0 , X0 = 4:5, i.e., the payo￿ from working must equal
the payo￿ from shirking under the belief that both the others shirk. Analo-
gously, we ￿nd that X1 = 3:6 and X2 = 90=35  2:6.
This implies that the high-reward player in 345COM, receiving a reward
of 5 per unit produced, will always work, irrespective of his beliefs (since
5 > X0 > X1 > X2). Anticipating this, the feasible beliefs for the medium-
reward player are such that he also has a dominant strategy to work (since
4 > X1 > X2). The only feasible belief of the low-reward player is thus to
expect both the others to work, in which case his reward induces him to work
as well (since 3 > X2). Hence the discriminating scheme enables players to
form exact beliefs about the other players’ decisions, although they move
simultaneously ￿ and repeated elimination of strongly dominated strategies
leads to the unique Nash equilibrium of all players exerting e￿ort.
Contrarily, this line of reasoning is not applicable when using the sym-
metric reward mechanism. Each player works only if he has the belief that at
least one other player exerts e￿ort as well (since X0 > 4 > X1 > X2). This
implies that in 444COM we have two equilibria in pure strategies: Either all
agents work, or all agents shirk (with all work being the payo￿- and risk-
dominant equilibrium). Besides that, also an equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists in which the probability of shirking is approximately 0:77 (and all
players know that each of the other players will shirk with this probability).
If we switch to the production function of substitutability, ￿rst consider
that a naive principal might be tempted to prefer this technology over the
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In both treatments, the payo￿s for the 5-type players from working dominate the payo￿s from shirking,
and so the possibility of zero matched agents working can be eliminated for the other players. Now
working dominates shirking for the 4-type players under complementarity, while the opposite is true for
the 3-type players under substitutability. The remaining player in both treatment now maximizes her
payo￿ by working. Thus the equilibria are derived through repeated elimination of dominated strategies.
The two pure equilibria of the egalitarian treatment 444COM are revealed by the crossover of the payo￿
functions of the 4-type player under complementarity. Note that the gain from working can be seen to
increase (diminish) under complementarity (substitutability).
previous one. For any given e￿ort sum, the number of units produced is
always equal or higher under substitutability than under complementarity.
However, in 345SUB the discriminating reward scheme is not optimal any-
more, because the threshold-order is reversed under a production function
of substitutability (i.e., X0  2:6, X1 = 3:6 and X2 = 4:5). Thus, the low-
reward player shirks in equilibrium, while the other two players work; and
all players hold corresponding beliefs. The payo￿ structure of the game and
the equilibria derivation are illustrated in ￿gure 1.
In fact, Winter (2004) shows that the total costs of an optimal, strongly
incentive-inducing reward scheme are always lower under complementarity
11than under substitutability. With respect to this, a sophisticated princi-
pal who believes that his agents are risk-neutral money-maximizers should
always try to ‘design’ the project in a way that workers’ e￿orts are comple-
ments rather than substitutes ￿ for example, he might prefer a function-based
technology over a process-based one. Yet Winter’s prediction crucially de-
pends on the assumption of subjects being self-centered money-maximizers.
By contrast, part of the literature (not only) in Behavioral and Experimental
Economics suggests that, beside pure money maximization, a non-negligible
fraction of subjects is strongly motivated by other-regarding considerations
￿ in particular, subjects exhibit a basic desire for equity, including a prefer-
ence for equal treatment of equals (cp. Selten (1978), Mowday (1991), Roemer
(1996)), and a preference for equal payo￿ distributions (cp. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)).
In the presence of equity considerations, any discriminating reward mech-
anism comes at some hidden costs which incentivize agents to shirk, even
under an initially incentive-inducing mechanism! Slight equity preferences 15
are already enough to let the superiority of the discriminating rewards van-
ish in 345COM. If agents’ loss of utility of another agent receiving a higher
payo￿ than their own is as low as 1=6 of the loss of utility of reducing their
own payo￿ by the same amount, all-shirk becomes the unique equilibrium
in 345COM.16 Even worse, due to the recursive nature of the equilibrium in
Winter’s model, the sheer belief that one or both of the other agents might
have equity preferences can alone lead to a loss of e￿ciency ￿ even if all
agents themselves are strictly self-centered money-maximizers. By contrast
in 444COM, equity preferences provide additional incentives not to shirk: If
a subject expects the other two players in his group to work, shirking will re-
duce his payo￿ and lead to a less equitable payo￿ distribution ( (260;170;170)
15Throughout the paper, equity preferences are de￿ned over payo￿s rather than e￿ort
levels (cp. Mohnen et al., forthcoming).
16The intuition behind this hypotheses can easily be seen if we reconceive above equilib-
ria derivations using an extended utility function which incorporates equality preferences,
e.g., the function described in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Using their model, all-shirk is
a possible equilibrium in 345COM if   1=3 and  = 0 ￿ which is a very conservative
estimate in comparison with empirical estimations. Since the exact calculations are rather
tedious and lengthy, they are available from the authors upon request.
12instead of (310;310;310)); which is something that (not only) an inequality-
averse subject would never prefer.
Taken together, if subjects are motivated by equity considerations instead
of being self-centered and money-maximizing, in the symmetric treatment
we cannot necessarily predict a lower e￿ciency than in the discriminating
treatment anymore. Already a meager amount of (uncertainty about) equal-
ity preferences reverses the initially low amount of strategic uncertainty in
345COM, whereas the symmetric mechanism in 444COM is rather robust in
this respect. This is recapitulated in the following table, which lists the pos-
sible equilibria in pure strategies for self-centered subjects in the ￿rst row,
and in the second row the equilibria that might additionally emerge in the
presence of equity-considerations:
Treatment 345SUB 345COM 444COM
production function substitutability complementarity
reward mechanism discriminating symmetric
self-centered (0,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1),(0,0,0)
inequality-averse (0,0,1) (0,0,0),(0,0,1),(0,1,1) no additional equ.
133 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiment with regard to our
research questions. First, we show that workers’ behavior is indeed sensitive
to the type of production function they face in their joint project, and that the
unequal treatment of equals does not necessarily hamper full e￿ort provision.
Accordingly, we then present data on a change in the reward scheme from
a discriminating to an egalitarian one, which suggests that equal treatment
of equals does not necessarily promote full e￿ort provision within a team of
agents.
3.1 Sensitivity to the Production Function
Figure 2 shows the mean e￿ort over all periods, conditional on player’s reward
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Figure 2: Mean e￿ort per reward type for the three treatments
Focussing on the discriminating reward scheme, overall e￿ort levels are
much higher under a production function of complementarity than under
a production function of substitutability. 91.7% of all e￿ort decisions in
345COM are to work, compared to only 65.3% in treatment 345SUB (rank-
14sum test, Prob > jzj = :0004). In 345COM, 6 out of 12 (9/12) groups
exert full e￿ort in all periods (all but one period), whereas the same is never
observed in 345SUB.
The di￿erence in e￿ciency between 345COM and 345SUB is predicted to
stem from a di￿erence in the behavior of the low-reward type in equilibrium.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the average e￿ort level of the low-reward type
in 345SUB is signi￿cantly lower than that of the other two types (22.2%
vs. 81.9% and 91.7%, signed-rank test, Prob > jzj = :0074 and :0039).
It is also signi￿cantly lower than the e￿ort level of the same type in the
complementarity treatment (22.2% vs. 88.9%, rank-sum test, Prob > jzj =
:0001). Subjects’ individual beliefs are in line with the ￿nding. In 345COM,
medium- and high-reward players believe that the low-reward player will
work in 85% of all cases, while in 345SUB the low-reward player is expected
to work in only 33% of all instances (rank-sum test, medium-reward: Prob >
jzj = :0004, high-reward: Prob > jzj = :0007).
The e￿ort levels of the medium- and high-reward types in 345COM (88.9%
and 97.2%) do not di￿er from the corresponding levels that we observe in
345SUB. Overall, when standard equilibrium predictions dictate e￿ort exer-
tion, the observed e￿ort levels are over 80%. In the one case in which the
equilibrium strategy is to shirk, indeed almost 80% of the decisions are to
shirk.
Comparing the sums of e￿ort per matching group in the ￿rst round and
the last round, we ￿nd no indication of a signi￿cant time trend (signed-rank
test: 345COM Prob > jzj = :65; 345SUB Prob > jzj = :31).17 The behavior
in the ￿rst round reveals a similar picture as above. Again, the number
of low-reward players choosing to exert e￿ort is much higher in 345COM
than in 345SUB (16.7% vs. 75%; Fisher’s exact test p = :012). For the
other two player types the di￿erences across treatments are only marginal
and statistically insigni￿cant (medium-reward type: 91.7% vs. 91.7%, p = 1;
high-reward type: 100% vs. 91.7%, p = 1).
Taken together, under a discriminating reward scheme the e￿ort provi-
17Cp. the corresponding time-series data in Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix.
15sion is almost maximal when using a complementarity production function;
whereas signi￿cantly lower e￿ort rates are observed when using one of sub-
stitutability. We thus conclude from our experimental data:
Result 1: In line with Winter’s model, agents’ observed behavior is sensitive
to the production technology. Treating equals unequally by using a discrimi-
nating reward scheme leads to almost full e￿ciency under a production func-
tion of complementarity ￿ whereas the same reward scheme does not perform
well under a production function of substitutability.
3.2 Sensitivity to the Reward Scheme
Before we turn our attention to the in￿uence of the reward scheme, let us
again point out that the discriminating reward scheme leads to almost max-
imum e￿ciency under a production function of complementarity, and that
even the low-reward players exert e￿ort in this situation. Notice that this
is not to say that equity considerations are completely absent in 345COM.
For example, the average rate of e￿ort provision over all periods is signi￿-
cantly di￿erent between the low- and the high-reward type (88.9% vs. 97.2%,
signed-rank test, Prob > jzj = :0261).18 Also the beliefs of medium- and
high-reward players about the low-reward player’s decision in the ￿rst pe-
riod reveal some in￿uence of equity considerations, because 42% (wrongly)
expect him to shirk.19 But although we observe some small signs of equity
considerations in our data, the in￿uence on the ￿nal outcome is negligible in
view of the high degree of e￿ciency in 345COM. This ￿nding is surprising in
the face of past ￿ndings from other experiments exploring the importance of
equity concerns ￿ and the following observations from our equitable reward
mechanism treatment 444COM gives rise to further surprise.
Given a production function of complementarity and keeping the total
18Yet, note that i) this is likely to be caused by a ceiling e￿ect; ii) in 5 out of the 8
instances where the low-reward player shirks, the behavior might also be explained by
self-centered preferences (best response given the individual belief); iii) behavior in the
￿rst period actually does not di￿er signi￿cantly across types.
19However, this vanishes with growing experience. The frequency changes to 85% if we
take all periods into account.
16cost of the reward mechanism constant, the observed mean e￿ciency in the
￿rst period is lower under the symmetric reward mechanism (78.9%) than
under the discriminating one (88.9%), albeit non-signi￿cant (rank-sum test,
Prob > jzj = :1552). Over the course of the experiment, the di￿erence grows
larger and signi￿cant (average e￿ciency over all periods of 72.2% vs. 91.7%,
rank-sum test, Prob > jzj = :0649; cp. Figure 2). On average, every reward
type in the discriminating treatment provides more e￿ort than the players
in the symmetric treatment. Only 3 out of 11 groups (4/11) exert full e￿ort
in all periods (all but one period), compared to 6 out of 12 (9/12) groups
in 345COM. Moreover, the standard deviation of group e￿ciencies is sig-
ni￿cantly higher in 444COM than in 345COM (0:233 vs. 0:158, Conover’s
squared-ranks test, Prob > jzj = :0143). Notice that the di￿erence is not an
artifact resulting from the high degree of e￿ciency in 345COM (which puts
a bound on the variance), as the group e￿ciencies in 345SUB, in which the
overall e￿ciency is similar to that in 444COM, show an even lower standard
deviation of 0:068 (cp. Figure 6 in the Appendix).
Our result suggests that equal treatment of equals does not necessar-
ily promote full e￿ort provision within a team of agents. A potential rea-
son for the observed di￿erence in e￿ciency between the symmetric and the
discriminating mechanism might be the introduction of the additional ‘all-
shirk’-equilibrium in treatment 444COM. Even though it is payo￿- and risk-
dominated by the ‘all-work’-equilibrium, the multiplicity of equilibria intro-
duces strategic uncertainty (cp. van Huyck et al. (1990)). 20 Players formu-
lating beliefs are uncertain whether the other players in their group will
work or shirk, which is visible in our data: 83% expect both other players
to work in 345COM, whereas only 62% do so in 444COM (rank-sum test,
Prob > jzj = :0979). This translates into low e￿ciency rates and a high
variance of group e￿ciencies in 444COM, suggesting that strategic consider-
ations shaped by the reward mechanism are crucial, and outweigh possible
equity preferences of the subjects. 21 The asymmetry of the reward mech-
20Note that strategic uncertainty should also be present in 345COM (cp. Section 2.2),
because ‘all-work’ and ‘all-shirk’ are potential equilibria once we allow for equity consid-
erations. Yet, we observe almost full e￿ciency in this treatment.
21One might consider that the result may be driven by a di￿erence in the subject pop-
17anism facilitates coordination among the agents. Under the discriminating
reward scheme, subjects can anticipate that the high-reward player will exert
e￿ort, which in turn incentivizes the medium- and low-reward players to do
so as well. On the other hand, the identical rewards under the symmetric
mechanism make it hard for the subjects to form beliefs about the action of
the other players, so that they are all in the dark. We thus conclude from
our experimental data:
Result 2: Treating equals equally is neither a necessary nor a su￿cient
prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams. Asymmetry facilitates
coordination under a production function of complementarity, i.e., we observe
higher e￿ciency rates under a discriminating reward mechanism than under
a cost-equivalent symmetric one ￿ which is again in line with Winter’s model.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the interaction in teams. More speci￿cally, we
experimentally explored whether workers’ behavior is sensitive to the exter-
nalities given by the production technology, and whether a major incentive
advantage exists when discriminating among perfectly identical agents. In
our experiment, three workers simultaneously decide on their individual pro-
vision of costly e￿ort to a joint project. Treatments di￿er in the shape of the
project’s production technology and of the reward mechanism. Under a pro-
duction technology of complementarity, the use of a symmetric reward mech-
anism elicits substantially lower e￿orts and e￿ciency than a cost-equivalent
discriminating reward mechanism. The same discriminating reward mecha-
nism underperforms when it is utilized under a production function of sub-
stitutability.
Our ￿ndings have important implications for the design of organizations
ulation between treatments. However, pairwise comparisons of the corresponding results
of the social value orientation test reveals no signi￿cant di￿erences across treatments
(345COM vs. 345SUB p = :66; 345COM vs. 444COM p = :52; 444COM vs. 345SUB
p = :98); in all treatments, subjects’ ‘value orientations’ indicate a general preference
for equitable treatment, i.e., they do di￿er signi￿cantly from being strictly self-centered
(345COM: p  :001; 345SUB: p  :001; 444SUB: p  :001).
18in practice. First, they clearly point to the relevance of the production func-
tion for organization construction ￿ a factor which has so far received little
attention in the literature. Designing (production) tasks in a way that makes
workers’ e￿orts complements rather than substitutes may lead to a major cost
advantage. Insofar as peer pressure constitutes a complementarity in e￿ort
exertion, the strengthening of social ties amongst the workforce alone might
have a strong impact on productivity.
Second, and closely related, is our ￿nding that unequal treatment of
equals does not necessarily hamper e￿ciency. Whenever the organizational
technology is one of complementarity, i.e., whenever the impact of a worker’s
input increases in the size of the others’ input, the usage of a discriminating
reward scheme might be potentially e￿ciency-enhancing. The main reason
for this is that asymmetric rewards facilitate coordination, because workers
can anticipate that those who have high stakes at hand will certainly exert
e￿ort ￿ which in turn incentivizes the other workers to exert e￿ort as well.
Consider that discrimination must not necessarily be in monetary terms, but
might also take the form of hierarchies. While a vast body of literature
in personnel economics already promotes the implementation of hierarchies
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981)), our results suggest that hierarchies might
enhance performance despite the absence of the existing literature’s usual
assumptions of monitoring or authority relations.
In this regard, we more generally contribute to the ongoing research on
behavioral phenomena in organizations. As James Konow (2000) puts it:
￿Many of the successes of economics can probably be attributed to its pushing
the assumption of self-interest to the extreme. To proceed further, however,
it may be necessary to incorporate richer behavioral assumptions that include
fairness and other moral standards.￿ (Konow (2000), p. 1089). While we
agree in principle, it should be added that it is additionally necessary to
identify the situations in which behavior is in line with the classical model
￿ which is ultimately an empirical question. Only then can we really under-
stand how to model the richer behavioral assumptions in a way to advance
Economics.
The results in this paper should not be taken as arguments against the im-
19portance of equity considerations in general. They rather suggest that equal
treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a su￿cient prerequisite for
eliciting high performance in teams. 22 Yet the relative importance of equity
considerations is likely to depend on the exact details of the organizational
setting and framework. In this paper, we presented experimental evidence
for some of these settings, and stressed the interaction between production
technologies and reward mechanisms. Other interesting variations of the or-
ganizational settings include a change in the timing of e￿ort choices, the
introduction of heterogeneity among the workforce or the use of ‘symbolic’
instead of monetary di￿erentiation. Extending our simple design allows for
studying these and other interesting aspects in the future.
22Taking a theoretical viewpoint, one might argue that this result is not surprising since
it immediately arises from Winter’s model. However, theoretical results need not neces-
sarily be compatible with actual behavior. This is nicely captured by the following quote
from Falkinger et al. (2000, p. 248) in the context of public goods provision mechanisms:
￿[The theoretical] mechanisms are desirably simple and do well in theory. It is, however,
important to note that the fact that a mechanism does well in theory, does not tell us
much about its e￿ectiveness in the laboratory and in practice. In principle, it could well
be the case that although the Nash equilibrium in the presence of the mechanism implies
an e￿cient provision of the public good, subjects’ actual behavior will generate signi￿cant
under- or overprovision. .. Deviations of actual behavior from the equilibrium predicted
by theory .. can arise because subjects’ motivations di￿er from the theoretically assumed
preferences.￿ Subject to these considerations, our empirical ￿ndings become all the more
important.
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24Appendix A: Instructions
This is the English translation of the instructions used in treatments 345COM and 444COM.
In treatment 345SUB, the table and examples were adjusted to ￿t the production function.
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. Please read the following in-
structions carefully. The experiment will be conducted anonymously, that
is to say you will not learn with whom of the other participants you are
interacting. Please keep in mind that from now on and throughout the ex-
periment you are not allowed to talk to the other participants. If you
have any questions, please give a signal with your hand and we will come
to you. During the experiment you can earn Taler. How much you earn
depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants in your
group. At the end of the experiment these Taler will be converted to Euro at
an exchange rate of 80 Taler = 1 EURO. The Euro amount will be paid
out to you. You will be called to collect your earnings. Please turn in all
instruction sheets when you collect your earnings.
In this experiment you will be randomly divided into groups of three persons.
Together with two other participants you form a group. Each participant
decides whether he wants to work normal or hard. The more participants
choose to work hard, the more units of goods will be produced.
Number (#) of hard working participants 0 1 2 3
Produced units of goods 20 40 65 100
Examples: In case that all participants of the group work normal, 20 units
will be produced altogether in your group. If you work hard and another
participant in your group works hard as well, 65 units will be produced
altogether in your group. etc... good
For each unit of goods produced, you receive a certain amount of Taler.
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed how many Taler you
earn per unit produced. Additionally, you learn how many Taler per unit the
other two participants in your group earn. Examples: In the beginning of the
experiment you are told that you receive 5 Taler for each unit produced. In
25case that all participants in your group work hard, 100 units will be produced
and you receive 500 Taler. In case that 40 units are produced, you receive
40  5 = 200 Taler. etc...
Costs: If you decide to work hard, the amount you receive is reduced by
90 Taler. If you work normal, no additional costs arise. Examples: You
and another participant in your group work hard, so 65 units are produced.
Accordingly, you receive 655 = 325 Taler. Since you worked hard, 90 Taler
are taken away. Hence, your ￿nal payment is 325   90 = 235 Taler. If
instead you worked normal, 40 units would be produced. You would receive
40  5 = 200 Taler. Since you worked normal, no Taler are subtracted from
this amount. Hence, your ￿nal payment would be 200 Taler. etc...
In order to facilitate the decision-making process, each participant is informed
in detail about his own possible payo￿s and the payo￿s of the other two
participants in his group. The corresponding information is given in table
form. For every participant, a table lists all possible payments dependent on
the own decision (to work normal or hard) and the decisions of the other two
participants in the group (none, one or both work hard). In these tables, the
corresponding costs for working hard have already been subtracted. Below,
you see an example with ￿ctional data:
In the lower right part of the screen, you can see another table. At the
beginning, the table is empty. In order to display data, you ￿rst have to
create a hypothetical situation: In the table of participant number 2, click
26on the corresponding button what you think how he will decide (to work
normal or hard). Furthermore, in the table of participant number 3, click
on the corresponding button what you think about his decision (to work
normal or hard). In the lower table you will then be shown in the ￿rst row
what the payment for you and the other two participants would be, in case
that your chosen situation actually occurs - and that you decide to work
normal. The second row lists the possible payments that you and the other
two participants would receive, in case that your chosen situation actually
occurs - and that you decide to work hard. At any time, you can display
data for a di￿erent situation. Simply change the situation by clicking on
a di￿erent button underneath the payment tables of participant number 2
and 3. Below you see another example with ￿ctional data:
Your decision: As soon as you have decided on whether you want to work
hard or normal, please click on the according button in the lower right table
(on the left hand side). The program will ask you to con￿rm your decision.
Afterwards, your decision will be transferred. Please remain in your cubicle
and wait until all participants have reached a decision. Afterwards, you will
be informed about the number of units produced in your group and about
your payo￿. This amount will be paid to you in cash and anonymously at
an exchange rate of 80 Taler = 1 EURO.
If you have any questions please give a signal with your hand!
27The following instructions were distributed and read out aloud only after the ￿rst period.
In the following, the previous procedure will be repeated ￿ve times within the
same group of persons and with the same numerical values for production
function and e￿ort costs. In each of these ￿ve periods, you again have to
choose between working normal or working hard. In the end, we randomly
select one of these ￿ve periods. You will receive the payo￿ for the randomly
selected period in addition to your present payo￿.
If you have any questions please give a signal with your hand! Otherwise,
please click to continue!
Appendix B: Supplementary Data
Treatment
345SUB 345COM 444COM


















Mean 65.3% 91.7% 72.2%
Observations re￿ect individual subjects, for each of whom the percentage of ’work hard’ decisions out of
the six periods was calculated. The standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table 1: Mean e￿ciencies (￿rst row) and standard deviation (second row)
for all rounds per player type over the treatments







Table 2: Comparison of mean e￿ciencies by player types between di￿erent
treatments with two-sided rank-sum test.
Figure 3: E￿ort per reward type over time in 345COM
29Figure 4: E￿ort per reward type over time in 345SUB
Figure 5: E￿ort per agent over time in 444COM
30Figure 6: Boxplots of average group e￿ciency rates
31